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Abstract—Machine learning models are vulnerable to adver-
sarial examples formed by applying small carefully chosen per-
turbations to inputs that cause unexpected classification errors.
In this paper, we perform experiments on various adversarial
example generation approaches with multiple deep convolutional
neural networks including Residual Networks, the best per-
forming models on ImageNet Large-Scale Visual Recognition
Challenge 2015. We compare the adversarial example generation
techniques with respect to the quality of the produced images,
and measure the robustness of the tested machine learning
models to adversarial examples. Finally, we conduct large-scale
experiments on cross-model adversarial portability. We find
that adversarial examples are mostly transferable across similar
network topologies, and we demonstrate that better machine
learning models are less vulnerable to adversarial examples.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last few years, deep neural networks have become
the most powerful machine learning models and have been
successfully applied to various tasks. Due to the significant
performance improvements on visual recognition tasks, state-
of-the-art machine learning models have managed to obtain
classification accuracies comparable to or even better than
human-level performance [1], [2], [3], [4]. This performance
boost is mainly the result of advances in two technical di-
rections, namely, building more powerful learning models and
designing better strategies to avoid overfitting.
Although deep neural networks provide outstanding perfor-
mance on various recognition tasks, an intriguing property
of these models was revealed by Szegedy et al. [5]. Ma-
chine learning models, including state-of-the-art deep neural
networks, unexpectedly and confidently misclassify inputs
crafted by adding imperceptible, non-random perturbations
to correctly classified images. These perturbed samples that
cause classification errors are called adversarial examples and
their existence reveals at least two problems. First, it demon-
strates that there is a classification inconsistency between
vulnerable machine learning models and human observers, as
adversarial images are generally indistinguishable from their
corresponding original inputs by human perception. Second,
adversarial examples demonstrate that deep neural networks
do not generalize well, in other words, they are not robust to
small perturbations to their inputs.
Szegedy et al. [5] also analyzed the cross-model generaliza-
tion of adversarial examples and concluded that “a relatively
large fraction of examples will be misclassified by networks
trained from scratch with different hyper-parameters (number
(a) VGG-16: white shark
PASS=0.9999, L2=15.84, L∞=1
(b) BVLC-GoogLeNet: hammerhead
PASS=0.9998, L2=60.93, L∞=3
(c) ResNet-50: hammerhead
PASS=0.9992, L2=111.43, L∞=5
(d) ResNet-152: white shark
PASS=0.9985, L2=165.93, L∞=9
Fig. 1: ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES AND PERTURBATIONS.
This figure shows adversarial examples and their corresponding per-
turbations for a tiger shark image generated by the fast gradient value
(FGV) approach [6] on four deep convolutional neural networks: (a)
VGG-16 [7], (b) Berkeley-trained version of GoogLeNet [1] (BVLC-
GoogLeNet), (c) Residual Network [4] with 50 layers (ResNet-50),
and (d) Residual Network with 152 layers (ResNet-152). The class
label of the adversarially perturbed ImageNet example and corre-
sponding metrics are shown below images: perceptual adversarial
similarity score (PASS) [6] between original and adversarial image
pairs, followed by L2 and L∞ norms of the adversarial perturbation.
For better visualization, perturbations are scaled by a factor of 25
with gray indicating no change. Although all examples are formed
by imperceptible perturbations for a human observer, adversarial
examples originating from better performing models in (c) and (d)
contain perturbations with higher magnitudes.
of layers, regularization or initial weights)”. They quantified
adversarial portability – the ability of adversarial examples
generated on one model to fool another – with respect to a
particular non-convolutional model on the MNIST dataset [8].
Although both Szegedy et al. [5] and Goodfellow et al. [9]
showed examples of adversarial images on ImageNet, they
only performed quantitative evaluation on the MNIST dataset.
Since deep neural networks are vulnerable to attacks by
applying small adversarial perturbations to their inputs, ad-
versarial examples pose a potential security threat for the
application of those machine learning models. The cross-
model portability of adversarial examples indicate a more
severe problem, namely, vulnerable machine learning systems
can be attacked by causing misclassifications without having
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access to the underlying model.
In this paper, we study different types of adversarial exam-
ples generated on various learning models, and analyze ad-
versarial portability across modern deep convolutional neural
networks. The major contributions of this paper are:
1) We generate adversarial examples on the ImageNet
dataset [10] by using three different low-cost techniques.
We evaluate these techniques by analyzing the produced
adversarial images with respect to various metrics.
2) We evaluate the robustness of eight deep neural networks
– including state-of-the-art models of recent years – to
adversarial examples by analyzing the metrics of the
generated examples.
3) We experimentally evaluate the portability of adversarial
examples across eight deep neural networks. We show
that adversarial images are mostly portable across sim-
ilar network topologies.
4) We find that best performing models are more difficult to
be fooled, i.e., networks with higher accuracies require
greater perturbations to form adversarial examples.
II. RELATED WORK
Adversarial examples in deep neural networks were dis-
covered by Szegedy et al. [5]. The authors demonstrated the
first method to reliably find these perturbations by a box-
constrained optimization technique (L-BFGS) that relies on
internal network state. However, due to the computationally
expensive L-BFGS optimization, this method is impractical.
Furthermore, Szegedy et al. performed experiments on a few
networks and datasets and concluded that a relatively large
fraction of the adversarial examples were misclassified by
different networks trained with varying hyperparameters or on
disjoint training sets.
Goodfellow et al. [9] presented the simpler and compu-
tationally cheaper fast gradient sign (FGS) algorithm for
adversarial generation, and also demonstrated that machine
learning models can benefit from these perturbed inputs. FGS
uses the sign of the gradient of loss with respect to the input
image to form adversarial perturbations. FGS is computa-
tionally efficient as the gradient can be effectively calculated
using backpropagation, and the generated perturbations cause
unexpected classification errors in various machine learning
models. Based upon FGS and by simply using the raw gradient
of loss, Rozsa et al. [6] formalized the fast gradient value
(FGV) method and introduced the hot/cold (HC) approach,
which is capable of efficiently producing multiple adversarial
examples for each input.
Papernot et al. [11] introduced a method to produce adver-
sarial perturbations by leveraging mappings between inputs
and outputs of neural networks. Their experiments on the
MNIST dataset suggest that identifying those mappings is
computationally expensive. Baluja et al. [12] proposed an
approach which generates perturbations, applies them to input
samples, and then observes how models respond to these
perturbed images. They applied small affine image transfor-
mations to form perturbations without utilizing the internal
state of the networks. Also, in order to filter out radical
perturbations and identify useful ones for retraining, Baluja et
al. used peer networks as a control-mechanism. Although these
types of guess and check approaches are capable of finding
adversarial perturbations, they can be prohibitively expensive.
Sabour et al. [13] demonstrated that adversarial images can
be produced by manipulating internal representations to mimic
those that are present in targeted images. Their approach also
relies on the inefficient L-BFGS algorithm. Moosavi-Dezfooli
et al. [14] introduced a method, which can produce adversarial
perturbations with small L2 or L∞ norms, but their approach
is also computationally expensive.
Several approaches have been published to increase the ro-
bustness of vulnerable machine learning models to adversarial
examples [9], [15], [16], [6], [17], [18]. These approaches can
also lead to further improved overall performances as well.
Researchers also try to assess the severity of the security
threat imposed by adversarial examples in the physical world
[19] or even suggest attack strategies that rely on the transfer-
ability of such examples [20], [21]. Specifically, Papernot et
al. [20], [21] suggest a black-box attack by crafting adversarial
samples on one model and apply those on the targeted oracle
to cause misclassification. The authors report that such attacks
can achieve high success rates with samples formed by adver-
sarial perturbations with radically increased magnitudes. Since
the “informal” definition of adversarial examples requires
small perturbations to be applied on original inputs, we note
that FGS examples with visually perceptible modifications
cannot be considered adversarial in nature. Furthermore, recent
advances indicate that those noisy samples would probably be
classified as unknown by open set deep networks [22], and –
depending on the dataset and context – that might eliminate
the threat posed by the introduced attack.
In this paper, we generate various types of adversarial
examples formed by perturbations with minimal magnitudes
that cause misclassifications, and we show on ImageNet that
adversarial portability across deep convolutional neural net-
works is relatively low compared to prior work focusing on
the MNIST dataset.
III. EXPERIMENTS
Szegedy et al. [5] demonstrated that the same adversarial
images are often misclassified by a variety of learning models
with different architectures or trained on varying training data.
In order to have a better understanding of the adversarial
portability problem for deep convolutional neural networks
and to assess the adversarial robustness of those networks,
we perform large-scale experiments with different types of
adversarial images on various machine learning models. In
this section, we introduce the models and the dataset that we
use, and briefly describe our experiments.
A. Models and Dataset
We test adversarial robustness and portability on the
ILSVRC-2014 challenge dataset, which contains 1000 object
categories from the large-scale hierarchical ImageNet [10]
ID MODEL TOP-1 TOP-5
M1 BVLC-AlexNet* 43.230% 20.012%
M2 VGG-16 31.642% 11.556%
M3 VGG-19 31.516% 11.558%
M4 Princeton-GoogLeNet 32.934% 12.104%
M5 BVLC-GoogLeNet 31.070% 10.856%
M6 ResNet-50 27.124% 8.864%
M7 ResNet-101 25.656% 8.054%
M8 ResNet-152 25.090% 7.798%
TABLE I: ERROR RATES. This table lists the top-1 and top-
5 classification error rates of the investigated models on the Ima-
geNet validation dataset. For consistency, we report error rates on
224× 224 pixel center crops from 256× 256 scaled images.
database with approximately 1.28M training images, 50K val-
idation images, and 100K test images (test images are publicly
not available). Performance of machine learning models is
evaluated by top-1 and top-5 accuracies.
The deep neural networks that we use in our experiments
are all publicly available: BVLC-AlexNet is a Berkeley-
trained version of the model introduced by Krizhevsky et
al. [23], VGG-16 and VGG-19 are 16-layer and 19-layer
networks of Simonyan et al. [7], BVLC-GoogLeNet is the
Berkeley-trained version of the network designed by Szegedy
et al. [1], Princeton-GoogLeNet is the GPU implementation
of GoogLeNet by the Princeton Vision Group and, finally,
ResNet-50, ResNet-101, and ResNet-152 are the 50-, 101-,
and 152-layer networks of He et al. [4], respectively.
To be able to test portability, we need all models to
operate on images having the same dimensions. Since BVLC-
AlexNet works with 227× 227 pixel images, while the others
use 224× 224, we fine-tuned the model on the training set
with the smaller crop size (a single epoch with the provided
hyperparameters and a constant learning rate of 10−4). In the
rest of the paper, we refer to this fine-tuned model as BVLC-
AlexNet*.
The performance of the eight models on the ImageNet
validation set is listed in Tab. I. We obtained these error rates
by using a single center crop from each of the 256× 256
scaled training images. Note that for some models, better
performance can be achieved by using 10-crop error (averaging
softmax scores of 10 224× 224 pixel crops) and/or by scaling
images with shorter side to 256 pixels.
For each of the 1000 classes, we selected 10 images from
the training set that were correctly classified by all eight
models. Therefore, the dataset that we use for our experiments
on adversarial images contains 10K images.
B. Adversarial Generation
In order to evaluate the adversarial robustness of the selected
models and quantify adversarial portability across them, we
use three adversarial example generation methods. First, the
fast gradient sign (FGS) method introduced by Goodfellow
et al. [9]. Second, the fast gradient value (FGV) approach
formalized in [6], which is built upon FGS. While FGS takes
steps in the direction defined by the sign of the gradient of loss
with respect to the image in order to reduce the score of the
correct class and cause mislabeling, FGV uses a scaled version
of the raw gradient of loss and produces notably different
adversarial perturbations than FGS. Third, the hot/cold (HC)
approach introduced by Rozsa et al. [6], which is capable of
generating multiple diverse adversarial samples from an input
by not only reducing the score of the original correct class –
denoted as the cold class – but in parallel by increasing the
score of a selected hot class. Specifically, we use the hot/cold
approach with only the most similar class with respect to the
classification score as hot (HC1) and, hence, we generate only
one adversarial example for each input with this technique.
We have selected these three adversarial generation methods
because they are computationally efficient and also able to
produce diverse samples.
We commence our experiments generating adversarial im-
ages on our dataset of 10K images. We use the three afore-
mentioned adversarial generation methods (FGS, FGV, and
HC1) with the previously listed eight deep neural networks and
collect various metrics on the produced samples to compare
the adversarial generation methods. As pointed out by Sabour
el al. [13], L2 and L∞ norms of adversarial perturbations are
not matched well to human perception. Since these measures
are extremely sensitive to even small geometric distortions and
do not map well to psychophysical notions of similarity, we
also use the perceptual adversarial similarity score (PASS) [6]
to better quantify “adversarial” in terms of human perception.
Additionally, we measure the adversarial success rate, i.e., the
relative number of images for which an adversarial example
can be generated. Adversarial image generation can fail in
two ways. First, the adversarial direction (e.g., the gradient
of loss with respect to the input image used by FGS and
FGV methods) can be exactly zero for all pixels. Second, any
arbitrarily large step into the adversarial direction – limited by
the discrete pixel values in range [0, 255] – does not change
the original label.
As we can see in Fig. 2(a), all three adversarial generation
methods maintain high success rates in terms of producing
adversarial images for their inputs on various deep neural net-
works. Particularly, HC1 reaches approximately 100 % success
rate on each model. Based on the metrics shown in Fig. 2, we
can observe that FGV and HC1 methods produce adversarial
perturbations with significantly higher L∞ norms, while the
formed adversarial images still maintain comparable or even
higher PASS scores than others generated by FGS.
C. Adversarial Robustness
By investigating the collected metrics of adversarial im-
ages generated by various methods on given deep neural
networks, we can compare the robustness of those networks
to adversarial examples. Specifically, increased L2 and L∞
norms of adversarial perturbations paired with decreased PASS
scores indicate higher robustness. In other words, models
that require samples formed by adversarial perturbations with
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Fig. 2: METRICS FOR ADVERSARIAL IMAGES. This figure shows various metrics for adversarial images generated by fast gradient
sign (FGS), fast gradient value (FGV), and hot/cold (HC1) approaches on the networks listed in Tab. I using 10K images of the ImageNet
training set. In (a) the mean and standard deviations of PASS scores and the adversarial success rates are displayed, while in (b) the means
and standard deviations of L2 and L∞ norms are presented.
higher magnitudes in terms of L2 and L∞ norms to cause
misclassifications are more robust to adversarial examples.
As shown by the collected metrics in Fig. 2(b), L2 and L∞
norms of adversarial perturbations generally increase as we
generate adversarial examples on better performing machine
learning models. We can see in in Fig. 2(a) that these stronger
perturbations also result in decreased PASS scores. Based on
these results, we can conclude that better performing models
lead to increased robustness to adversarial examples as well.
To better illustrate this phenomenon, we show FGV adver-
sarial examples with corresponding perturbations in Fig. 1
crafted from the same input image on four different models.
Although these samples contain imperceptible modifications
to the human eye, we can observe that a significantly stronger
perturbation is required to cause misclassification on the cur-
rent state-of-the-art Residual Network, denoted as ResNet-152
in Fig. 1(d), compared to VGG-16 shown in Fig. 1(a). Finally,
we can state that not only the magnitudes and structures of
these perturbations vary, but they can lead to different mis-
classifications. Depending on the model, the same adversarial
image generation approach turns the tiger shark into a white
shark or a hammerhead.
D. Adversarial Portability
To evaluate the transferability of adversarial examples
across deep convolutional neural networks, we use the differ-
ent types of adversarial images – formed by using either the
fast gradient sign (FGS) method, the fast gradient value (FGV)
method, or the hot/cold approach with the most similar class
in terms of classification score (HC1) – that we generated on
the dataset described in Sec. III-A. Since FGS, FGV, and HC1
methods all rely on internal network state, the perturbations
that form adversarial images on various networks can be
significantly different – as demonstrated by the FGV examples
shown in Fig. 1 that were generated on a tiger shark.
To quantify adversarial portability, we test the constructed
adversarial examples across the eight deep convolutional neu-
ral networks listed in Tab. I, and calculate the proportion of
transferable samples. The graphically summarized results are
presented in Fig. 3. Apparently, adversarial images originating
from similar models or models sharing the same network
architecture are generally more portable across corresponding
machine learning models. For example, 29.00 % of FGS adver-
sarial images generated on the VGG-16 network (denoted as
FGS-M2 in Fig. 3) remain adversarial on the VGG-19 model,
and 27.59 % of VGG-19 samples (FGS-M3) are transferable to
VGG-16. Similar patterns can be observed between the BVLC-
GoogLeNet and the Princeton-GoogLeNet models: 14.23 %
of the BVLC-GoogLeNet FGS adversarial images (FGS-M5)
are transferable to Princeton-GoogLeNet and 12.88 % remain
portable in the opposite direction (FGS-M4). Although the
portability rates between Residual Networks are lower, they
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Fig. 3: CROSS-MODEL PORTABILITY OF ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES. This figure shows the percentage of adversarial examples
generated on one network that are adversarial to other networks. Adversarial examples of types FGS, FGV, and HC1 are generated on the
learning models as listed in Tab. I (shown on the horizontal axis), and tested on the networks displayed in the vertical axis. The diagonals
display the self-portability of adversarial examples, which is 100 % in each case.
exhibit the same behavior: 12.13 % of FGS samples originat-
ing from ResNet-101 (FGS-M7) cause misclassifications on
ResNet-50, while 7.97 % of adversarial samples are portable
backwards (FGS-M6).
Fig. 3 displays that the tested models are more robust to
FGV and HC1 samples than to FGS samples. We believe that
the higher portability of FGS samples is due to the application
of the sign in the fast gradient sign method, which provides
equal importance to pixels regardless their actual raw value in
the gradient of loss. Specifically, FGS applies unnecessarily
large modifications on pixels that do not play an important role
in reducing the loss, and these redundant perturbations make
FGS examples more transferable. Therefore, the portability
rates for FGV and HC1 adversarial images are significantly
lower than for FGS samples. The most transferable adversarial
images among FGV and HC1 are HC1 samples of the ResNet-
152 model (denoted as HC1-M8 in Fig. 3) tested on BVLC-
AlexNet* network with 9.99 % portability rate. In other words,
HC1 adversarial samples generated on the best performing
network cause the most classification errors on the worst
performing model. On the other hand, adversarial examples
generated on BVLC-AlexNet* are nearly never portable to
other networks.
As shown in Fig. 3, adversarial examples generated on the
best performing networks, i.e., the Residual Networks, are
generally more portable to others. Since those networks are
the most robust among the tested models, their adversarial
examples contain the strongest perturbations and, therefore,
we assume that those samples become more transferable.
In summary, the results suggest that FGS examples are
more transferable than FGV or HC1 samples, and adversarial
images are mainly portable across similar networks, e.g., VGG
models (VGG-16, VGG-19), GoogleNets (BVLC-GoogLeNet,
Princeton-GoogLeNet) or Residual Networks (ResNet-50,
ResNet-101, ResNet-152). However, the tranferability rates
that we obtained on the ImageNet dataset are considerably
lower than Szegedy et al. [5] observed when they analyzed
cross-model generalization of adversarial examples on the
MNIST dataset.
IV. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have generated adversarial examples on
eight deep convolutional neural networks, including state-of-
the-art models of recent years, with three different adversarial
generation methods. We have evaluated these methods with
respect to their success rates, and quantitatively compared
various types of adversarial images. We have found that all
three methods – fast gradient sign (FGS), fast gradient value
(FGV), and hot/cold (HC) – can efficiently produce adversarial
samples on all tested models.
By analyzing the collected metrics – L2 and L∞ norms of
adversarial perturbations, and perceptual adversarial similarity
score (PASS) of original and adversarial image pairs – on
the tested models, we have observed that better performing
networks are more robust to adversarial perturbations. We
believe that more accurate deep convolutional neural networks
learn feature mappings for the given classification task that
make classes more separable and, therefore, these models gen-
eralize better, leading to both higher accuracies and improved
robustness.
We have performed large-scale experiments on the Ima-
geNet dataset to investigate the portability of various types of
adversarial images across multiple deep convolutional neural
networks including the fine-tuned version of BVLC-AlexNet,
the publicly available versions of VGG-16 and VGG-19,
Princeton-GoogLeNet, BVLC-GoogLeNet, and three versions
of Residual Network models. As our results suggest, adver-
sarial images are more transferable between networks sharing
the same or similar network architectures, and adversarial
samples originating from better performing models are more
transferable to more vulnerable networks due to their stronger
adversarial perturbations. Furthermore, our experiments have
highlighted that adversarial images generated by FGS are more
portable than others produced by FGV or HC.
In our cross-model transferability experiments, we have
used adversarial examples formed by perturbations with min-
imal magnitudes that cause misclassifications. We note that
sometimes these perturbations are highly perceptible and,
therefore, the crafted samples cannot be considered adversar-
ial. While those noisy samples are not adversarial in nature,
they still have an effect on our measured portability rates
as, due to their stronger perturbations, they are certainly
more portable across networks. The perceptual adversarial
similarity score (PASS) seems to be the straightforward mea-
sure to differentiate adversarial from noisy samples, i.e., to
quantitatively define adversarialness by measuring the simi-
larity/distinguishability of original and perturbed image pairs.
Specifying an applicable threshold for PASS scores to define
adversarial is beyond the scope of this paper.
There are already applied mechanisms to inadvertently
mitigate the transferability problem of adversarial examples.
To achieve better performances on various visual recognition
tasks, machine learning systems often use multiple crops for
classification. Namely, several crops are extracted from the
input and after classifying them independently, the model
makes the final classification by fusing the results obtained
from the crops. Luo et al. [15] proposed a mechanism to
alleviate the recognition errors caused by adversarial images,
which is basically based upon cropping. Their foveation-based
technique uses only a sub-region of the image during classi-
fication. The authors demonstrated that the negative effect of
foveated perturbations to classification scores can be signif-
icantly reduced compared to entire perturbations, suggesting
that foveation approaches can improve the robustness of neural
networks to adversarial examples. Another popular approach
to obtain better classification performances is the application
of multiple models by using an ensemble of networks. For
instance, He et al. [4] applied an ensemble of three Residual
Networks. As we demonstrated, the proportion of portable
adversarial images among Residual Networks is relatively low.
Therefore, the application of ensembles can further improve
the robustness to adversarial examples.
In summary, considering our experimental results and the
aforementioned techniques applied in real-world applications,
we conclude that the security threat posed by adversarial
portability is moderate, at most, but this area is still important
for applications and future research.
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